Abstract
To the CM model for projects in China, this paper analyzes the basic conditions of bidirectional moral hazard for the construction units and consultant, and builds the model. On this basis，it explores benefit function of the two payment forms for consulting and contracting in CM model. Finally, stimulates innovation model to the limitations of the CM mode Payment in order to reduce the risk of moral hazard in the delegate.
| Translated title of the contribution | The analysis of risk and incentive model about the project CM model under asymmetric information |
|---|---|
| Original language | Chinese (Simplified) |
| Pages (from-to) | 90-93 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Journal | Jianzhu Jingji (Construction Economy) |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue number | 368 |
| Publication status | Published - 2013 |
Keywords
- information asymmetry
- construction industry
- management
- moral hazard