A computational model of logic-based negotiation

Research output: Chapter in Book / Conference PaperConference Paperpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents a computational model of negotiation based on Nebel's syntax-based belief revision. The model guarantees a unique bargaining solution for each bargaining game without using lotteries. Its game-theoretic properties are discussed against the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. We also study essential computational properties in relation to our negotiation model. In particular, we show that the deal membership checking is DP-complete and the corresponding agreement inference problem is ∏2P-hard.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 18th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-06/IAAI-06
Pages728-733
Number of pages6
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Event21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 18th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-06/IAAI-06 - Boston, MA, United States
Duration: 16 Jul 200620 Jul 2006

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume1

Conference

Conference21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 18th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-06/IAAI-06
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityBoston, MA
Period16/07/0620/07/06

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