A logical multidemand bargaining model with integrity constraints

Xiaoxin Jing, Dongmo Zhang, Xudong Luo, Jieyu Zhan

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper proposes a logical model of multi-demand bargaining with integrity constraints. We also construct a simultaneous concession solution to bargaining games of this kind and show that the solution is uniquely characterized by a set of logical properties. Moreover, we prove that the solution also satisfies the most fundamental game theoretic properties such as symmetry and Pareto optimality. In addition, by lots of simulation experiments we study how the number of conflicting demands, bargainers' risk attitude, and bargainer number influence the bargaining success rate and efficiency as well as the agreement quality.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)673-697
    Number of pages25
    JournalInternational Journal of Intelligent Systems
    Volume31
    Issue number7
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2016

    Bibliographical note

    Publisher Copyright:
    © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

    Keywords

    • game theory
    • logic programming
    • negotiation

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