TY - JOUR
T1 - A sequential model for reasoning about bargaining in logic programs
AU - Chen, Wu
AU - Zhang, Dongmo
AU - Wu, Maonian
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - This paper presents a sequential model of bargaining based on abductive reasoning in ASP. We assume that each agent is represented by a logic program that encodes the background knowledge of the agent. Each agent has a set of goals to achieve but these goals are normally unachievable without an agreement from the other agent. We design an alternating-offers procedure that shows how an agreement between two agents can be reached through a reasoning process based on answer set programming and abduction. We prove that the procedure converges to a Nash equilibrium if each player makes rational offer/counter-offer at each round.
AB - This paper presents a sequential model of bargaining based on abductive reasoning in ASP. We assume that each agent is represented by a logic program that encodes the background knowledge of the agent. Each agent has a set of goals to achieve but these goals are normally unachievable without an agreement from the other agent. We design an alternating-offers procedure that shows how an agreement between two agents can be reached through a reasoning process based on answer set programming and abduction. We prove that the procedure converges to a Nash equilibrium if each player makes rational offer/counter-offer at each round.
UR - http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/538510
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-40564-8_24
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-40564-8_24
M3 - Article
SN - 0302-9743
VL - 8148
SP - 239
EP - 244
JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ER -