Abstract
In this chapter, I will explain two contrasting theories of animal property rights (Hadley 2015). Whereas each of the two theories is consistent with the idea of giving wild animals property rights in their habitats, only the first theory, what I will refer to as the ‘justice theory, ’ is consistent with the idea that habitat rights are owed to animals as a matter of basic justice. What do I mean by justice? When rights are held as a matter of basic justice, it means that certain persons must act in prescribed ways and states must pass laws designed to ensure that the intended recipients enjoy the relevant rights. The ethical presupposition behind the concept of justice is that people are obliged to act (or not act) irrespective of whether acting (or not acting) in such a way suits them. In other words, justice is a normative or aspirational concept: it speaks to what people should do and how states should be governed. 1 As far as animal property rights are concerned, the kernel of the justice theory is that people have an obligation to refrain from violating the habitat rights of wild animals. Below, I will say more about how such an obligation might translate in the real world, but suffice to say now it means that human landholders must act in good faith and take into account the interests of animals during land-management decision making.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Natural Resources and Environmental Justice: Australian Perspectives |
Editors | Anna Lukasiewicz, Stephen Dovers, Libby Robin, Jennifer McKay, Steven Schilizzi, Sonia Graham |
Place of Publication | Clayton South, Vic. |
Publisher | CSIRO |
Pages | 133-142 |
Number of pages | 10 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781486306398 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781486306374 |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- animals
- right of property
- habitat conservation
- Australia