Bargaining, coalitions and local expenditure

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    9 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We extend the literature on local expenditure determination by showing that bargaining and grand coalition seem to facilitate collective decision-making in an assembly of elected councillors. We demonstrate that the solution of the game turns on the principle of equal relative concession. Based on limited experimentation, we assess the performance of local governments and find that group dominance frustrates local expenditure efficiency in urban localities of India.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)2379-2391
    Number of pages13
    JournalUrban Studies
    Volume38
    Issue number13
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2001

    Keywords

    • India
    • coalitions
    • decision-making
    • expediture, public
    • local government

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Bargaining, coalitions and local expenditure'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this