Abstract
Focusing on the account of synthesis in Kant's Transcendental Deduction allows us to see a greater degree of compatibility between the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason than is sometimes thought. The first Deduction shows that while it emphasizes an account of empirical synthesis it also includes a more properly transcendental account of the synthetic unity required for cognition. The second edition simply focuses on this feature of synthesis to the exclusion of the empirical. The result: a complete account of synthesis with the A-edition starting "bottom up" from sense and the B-edition working "top-down" from thought.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 81-93 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Epoche |
Volume | 10 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2005 |
Keywords
- Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804
- Critique of Pure Reason
- Metaphysics
- Theories of Knowledge
- Epistemology