Competitive tax evasion and transfer prices

Partha Gangopadhyay

doi:10.1142/S0219198907001448

Competitive tax evasion and transfer prices

Partha Gangopadhyay

School of Business

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We develop an interactive model involving competitive tax evasion to determine optimal transfer prices by multinational firms. We establish that the proposed game is characterized by multiple equilibria. Implications of these multiple equilibria are examined.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	347-351
Number of pages	5
Journal	International Game Theory Review
Volume	9
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198907001448
Publication status	Published - Jun 2007

Keywords

Nash equilibria
Selection of equilibrium
Tax evasion
Transfer prices

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1142/S0219198907001448

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title = "Competitive tax evasion and transfer prices",

abstract = "We develop an interactive model involving competitive tax evasion to determine optimal transfer prices by multinational firms. We establish that the proposed game is characterized by multiple equilibria. Implications of these multiple equilibria are examined.",

keywords = "Nash equilibria, Selection of equilibrium, Tax evasion, Transfer prices",

author = "Partha Gangopadhyay",

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KW - Transfer prices

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Competitive tax evasion and transfer prices

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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