Abstract
We develop an interactive model involving competitive tax evasion to determine optimal transfer prices by multinational firms. We establish that the proposed game is characterized by multiple equilibria. Implications of these multiple equilibria are examined.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 347-351 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | International Game Theory Review |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2007 |
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Keywords
- Nash equilibria
- Selection of equilibrium
- Tax evasion
- Transfer prices
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