Deregulator : judgment day for microeconomics

The economic theory that motivated the deregulation and privatization of the US electricity industry is seriously flawed in three crucial ways. First, the Marshallian theory of the firm is based on two mathematical errors which, when amended, reverse the accepted welfare rankings of competitive and monopoly industry structures: on the grounds of corrected neoclassical theory, monopoly should be preferred to competition. Second, while proponents of deregulation expected market-clearing equilibrium prices to apply, it is well known that the equilibrium of a system of spot market prices is unstable. This implies that imposing spot market pricing on as basic an industry as electricity is likely to lead to the kind of volatility observed under the deregulation. Third, extensive empirical research has established that on the order of 95% of firms do not produce under conditions of rising marginal cost. Requiring electricity firms to price at marginal cost was therefore likely to lead to bankruptcies, as indeed occurred. The economic preference for marginal cost spot market pricing is therefore theoretically unsound, and it is no wonder that the actual deregulatory experience was as bad as it was.