Doubting the transcendental realist solution to the Humean problem of induction

In his book A Realist Theory of Science, Roy Bhaskar claims to have "resolved" the Humean problem of induction. This paper raises doubts about that claim. The paper outlines the Humean problem of induction. It then gives a brief systematic account of Bhaskar's transcendental realist ontology. This ontology posits a version of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature and is claimed to be justified by a transcendental deduction, thereby providing a solution to the Humean problem of induction. The paper argues that Bhaskar's deduction of the Principle based on the 'intelligibility of science' begs the question and thus fail to fully meet Hume's challenge. Bhaskar's 'fall back' position" that the Principle is justified on the grounds of 'plausibility'" is also questioned. The paper concludes with some reflections on the nature and role of ontological concepts.]]