Dynamic auction for efficient competitive equilibrium under price rigidities

Junwu Zhu, Dongmo Zhang

    Research output: Chapter in Book / Conference PaperConference Paperpeer-review

    6 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    ![CDATA[In an auction market where the price of each selling item is restricted to an admissible interval (price rigidities), a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to exist. Dreze (1975) introduced a variant concept of Walrasian equilibrium based on rationing systems, named constrained Walrasian equilibrium, for modelling an economy with price rigidities. Talman and Yang (2008) further refined the concept and proposed a dynamic auction procedure that converges to a constrained Walrasian equilibrium. However, a constrained Walrasian equilibrium does not guarantee market efficiency. In other words, a constrained Walrasian equilibrium allocation does not necessarily lead to the best market value. In this paper, we introduce a concept of competitive equilibrium by weakening the concept of constrained Walrasian equilibrium and devise an dynamic auction procedure that generates an efficient competitive equilibrium.]]
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of AI 2011: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: 24th Australasian Joint Conference, Perth, Australia, December 5-8, 2011
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages809-818
    Number of pages10
    ISBN (Print)9783642258312
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011
    EventAustralasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence -
    Duration: 1 Dec 2013 → …

    Conference

    ConferenceAustralasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
    Period1/12/13 → …

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Dynamic auction for efficient competitive equilibrium under price rigidities'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this