Abstract
In an auction market where the price of each selling item is restricted to an admissible interval (price rigidities), a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to exist. Dreze (1975) introduced a variant concept of Walrasian equilibrium based on rationing systems, named constrained Walrasian equilibrium, for modelling an economy with price rigidities. Talman and Yang (2008) further refined the concept and proposed a dynamic auction procedure that converges to a constrained Walrasian equilibrium. However, a constrained Walrasian equilibrium does not guarantee market efficiency. In other words, a constrained Walrasian equilibrium allocation does not necessarily lead to the best market value. In this paper, we introduce a concept of competitive equilibrium by weakening the concept of constrained Walrasian equilibrium and devise an dynamic auction procedure that generates an efficient competitive equilibrium.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings of AI 2011: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: 24th Australasian Joint Conference, Perth, Australia, December 5-8, 2011 |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Pages | 809-818 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783642258312 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 |
| Event | Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Duration: 1 Dec 2013 → … |
Conference
| Conference | Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
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| Period | 1/12/13 → … |