Evaluating the Community Effects of the NSW Police Counter-Radicalisation Community Engagement Model

There are many measures of the success of counter terrorism policing. Critical indicators include whether a terror event is prevented and whether people susceptible to radicalisation can be convinced against extremist actions. Another indicator of the success of counter terror policing is the extent to which there is co-operation and trust between communities and police. This research set out to examine the success of the community engagement strategy of the Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command. This research squarely engaged a contested question in the international policing literature on whether it is possible to undertake effective anti-terrorism community policing. The aims of the research were to: gather Muslim community views and experiences of the community engagement initiative in the context of attempts to move beyond mistrust and alienation in the recent history between these two groups; gauge the perceived likelihood of the success of the community engagement initiative; describe and theorise the findings in relation to shifts in contemporary policing strategies and the official state response to racial/ethnic and religious marginalisation. The research used face-to-face surveys with members of the Sydney Muslim communities with whom the Community Engagement Unit officers had contact. Key findings of the research included: two-thirds of the respondents from the Sydney Muslim community knew of the community engagement initiative of the Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command of the NSW Police Force; 91% had come to know of the community engagement initiative through personal contact with officers from the Community Contact Officers of the Community Engagement Unit; most had come to see the community engagement initiative as a having relationship building rationale; three-quarters knew who they could inform if they thought someone they knew was at risk of radicalisation; only a half knew about legislative changes proscribing terrorist speech, writing and fundraising; half had seen materials in a native language outlining important legislative changes, policy initiatives or community forums; direct contact with Community Contact Officers occurred mostly at community events, mosques and cultural centres; 90% of respondents characterised their contacts with the Community Contact Officers as non-confrontational; 55% perceived the Community Contact Officers as having a mid- to high visibility in the community; half felt that they had been consulted on the issue of radicalisation; the majority of respondents perceived their own role as collaborator or partner with the Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command of the NSW Police Force; 82% of respondents were eager to co-operate with the Community Contact Officers; almost two-thirds had high levels of trust in the Community Contact Officers; 79% felt that recent court convictions and sentences had not jeopardised relations of trust with police; two-thirds saw the Community Engagement initiative as a success. The Report recommendations include: further research on community perceptions must draw on a larger sample to ensure a diversity of respondents, and use a recruitment strategy that does not rely solely on police contacts; the community engagement initiative should embed a stronger consultation with the communities on the nature and extent of the problem; to build deeper levels of trust of police among the section of the communities where that might be lacking; take action to convince as many as one-third of the communities who are not convinced as to the success of the community engagement initiative, and convince the 60% who are not convinced that it is the most appropriate and effective means for countering radicalisation; expand the information about, promotion, and visibility of the community engagement initiative; expand the levels of community consultation, engagement and police presence at community events; expand the police consultation beyond the traditional leadership groups, to other sections of the Muslim communities and demographics; enlist more Muslim police, and provide more training for police officers who work with Muslim citizens.