Experimental market mechanism design for double auction

Masabumi Furuhata, Laurent Perrussel, Jean-Marc Thévenin, Dongmo Zhang

    Research output: Chapter in Book / Conference PaperConference Paperpeer-review

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with different experimental settings. The results of experiments provide us a better understanding of the interrelationship among market policies and also show that an experimental approach can greatly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of market mechanism design.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationAI 2009: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: 22nd Australasian Joint Conference: Melbourne, Australia, December 1-4, 2009: Proceedings
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages1-10
    Number of pages10
    ISBN (Print)9783642104381
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2009
    EventAustralasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence -
    Duration: 1 Dec 2013 → …

    Publication series

    Name
    ISSN (Print)0302-9743

    Conference

    ConferenceAustralasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
    Period1/12/13 → …

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