Human-robot cooperation in prisoner dilemma games : people behave more reciprocally than prosocially toward robots

Te-Yi Hsieh, Bishakha Chaudhury, Emily S. Cross

Research output: Chapter in Book / Conference PaperConference Paperpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This study investigated human-robot cooperation in the context of prisoner's dilemma games and examined the extent to which people's willingness to cooperate with a robot would vary according to the incentives provided by a game context. We manipulated the payoff matrices of human-robot prisoner's dilemma games and predicted that people would cooperate more often in the situation where cooperating with the robot was a relatively more rewarding option. Our results showed that, in the early rounds of the game, participants made significantly more cooperative decisions, when the game structure providing more incentives for cooperation. However, their subsequent game decisions were dominantly driven by Cozmo's previous game choices and the incentive structure was no longer a predictive factor to their decisions. The findings suggest that people have a strong reciprocal tendency to social robots in economic games and this tendency might even surpass the influence of the reward value of their decisions.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHRI '20: Companion of the 2020 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction, March 23-26, 2020, Cambridge, United Kingdom
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages257-259
Number of pages3
ISBN (Print)9781450370578
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 23 Mar 2020
EventACM/IEEE Conference on Human-Robot Interaction -
Duration: 1 Jan 2020 → …

Conference

ConferenceACM/IEEE Conference on Human-Robot Interaction
Period1/01/20 → …

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 ACM.

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