Immanence in Schelling and Hegel in the Jena period

Paolo Diego Bubbio, Daniele Fulvi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this article, we argue that in the Jena period (1801–1803) Schelling and Hegel both rejected the conception of God as coinciding with the moral order, which they attribute to Fichte; such coincidence, in their view, turned God into a transcendent and merely moral Being. In an effort to demonstrate their distance from Fichte’s view, we contend, Schelling and Hegel advocated for a metaphysical (rather than merely moral) and immanent (rather than transcendent) understanding of God, conceived in its inextricable relation with nature and self-consciousness. We conclude by demonstrating that the cooperation between Schelling and Hegel in the Jena period led them to develop an analogous conception of immanence—which already foreshadows, however, the different directions that Schelling and Hegel take in their mature works.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)353-387
Number of pages35
JournalSouthern Journal of Philosophy
Volume60
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Immanence in Schelling and Hegel in the Jena period'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this