Introduction : questioning the orthodoxy

In ‘Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World’ University of Illinois economist Deirdre McCloskey draws attention to a distinction between, on the one hand, original research and, on the other hand, innovative research. According to McCloskey, original research is the application of existing knowledge to pressing problems and issues, and innovative research is the creation of altogether new knowledge. McCloskey's thesis is that the extraordinary improvement in living standards between 1800 to the present day cannot be explained by the workings of markets alone; instead, progress is the product of human ingenuity, that is, innovative research in a wide range of fields including the arts and humanities. If McCloskey’s distinction between original research and innovative research is sound, then there has been relatively little innovation in the field of animal ethics. Indeed, even the most respected and widely cited philosophers in the field, such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, have not produced genuinely innovative research. After all, Singer and Regan are, respectively, utilitarian and deontological philosophers first and animal ethicists second. In other words, they have each applied existing theories to the problem of human relations with other animals but have not created new knowledge as such. In other words, they have produced merely original research, and they have not produced innovative research. To say that a philosopher has produced merely original research, as opposed to genuinely innovative research, sounds like casting aspersions. But our point is not to sleight the considerable achievements of the many dozens of philosophers who have contributed to animal ethics theory; rather, we aim to draw attention to the nature of the discipline and the idea of progress within it. If McCloskey’s distinction is sound, very few philosophers create new knowledge because we all, to some extent, respond to what others say or we disagree with someone else's interpretation of another theorist's work. While it is true that there is a sense in which new knowledge is created when we identify a hitherto overlooked implication of an existing theory, the innovativeness in such cases remains derivative of the initial creativity and, thus, more the product of effort rather than ingenuity. Of course, it is open to readers to reject McCloskey’s distinction, but we think it is useful for thinking about the state of play in animal ethics and the future of the discipline. It goes without saying that the editors of this collection are as guilty as any other philosophers of producing what McCloskey would suggest is merely original research.