Abstract
This article focuses on the analysis of the highly problematic relationship between Psychology and Phenomenology in Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences, in order to show that this last writing allows us to reconsider the criticisms addressed to descriptive psychology since the first breakthrough of phenomenology. Husserl not only tries to bring psychology back into phenomenological field by describing it as a privileged “way to reduction”, but he more fundamentally shows that the closest examination of the crisis-structure of psychology is essential to the understanding of subjectivity. The psychological dimension of subjectivity is neither a mere difficulty of transcendental philosophy, nor an accident in the history of subjectivity, but it discloses the problem upon which lays the transcendental meaning of subjectivity. According to this point of view, Psychology has to deliver its fullness of content and its empirical richness to subjectivity, and so to give phenomenology back its descriptive dimension.
Translated title of the contribution | Psychology and the cross of transcendental phenomenology |
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Original language | French |
Pages (from-to) | 163-192 |
Number of pages | 30 |
Journal | Studia Phaenomenologica |
Volume | 10 |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Keywords
- psychology
- phenomenology
- subjectivity