Maximal matching for double auction

Dengji Zhao; Dongmo Zhang; Md Khan; Laurent Perrussel

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-17432-2_52

Maximal matching for double auction

Dengji Zhao, Dongmo Zhang, Md Khan, Laurent Perrussel

School of Computer, Data & Mathematical Sciences

Research output: Chapter in Book / Conference Paper › Conference Paper › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the problem of mechanism design for a double auction market where multiple buyers and sellers buy and sell a commodity. We design and implement a matching algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, including the number of transactions and buy/sell-volume. We prove that, given the number of matches, the algorithm also maximizes auctioneer's profit. Based on the CAT Tournament (Trading Agent Competition Market Design) platform, we show with experiments that the new matching method not only increases market liquidity but also significantly improves market share and auctioneer's profit in the long term, compared with equilibrium matching, the most commonly used matching method.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	AI 2010: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the 23rd Australasian Joint Conference, Adelaide, Australia, December 2010
Publisher	Springer
Pages	516-525
Number of pages	10
ISBN (Print)	9783642174315
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17432-2_52
Publication status	Published - 2010
Event	Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Duration: 1 Dec 2013 → …

Conference

Conference	Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Period	1/12/13 → …

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10.1007/978-3-642-17432-2_52

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title = "Maximal matching for double auction",

abstract = "We study the problem of mechanism design for a double auction market where multiple buyers and sellers buy and sell a commodity. We design and implement a matching algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, including the number of transactions and buy/sell-volume. We prove that, given the number of matches, the algorithm also maximizes auctioneer's profit. Based on the CAT Tournament (Trading Agent Competition Market Design) platform, we show with experiments that the new matching method not only increases market liquidity but also significantly improves market share and auctioneer's profit in the long term, compared with equilibrium matching, the most commonly used matching method.",

author = "Dengji Zhao and Dongmo Zhang and Md Khan and Laurent Perrussel",

year = "2010",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-17432-2_52",

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note = "Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence ; Conference date: 01-12-2013",

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T1 - Maximal matching for double auction

AU - Zhao, Dengji

AU - Zhang, Dongmo

AU - Khan, Md

AU - Perrussel, Laurent

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We study the problem of mechanism design for a double auction market where multiple buyers and sellers buy and sell a commodity. We design and implement a matching algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, including the number of transactions and buy/sell-volume. We prove that, given the number of matches, the algorithm also maximizes auctioneer's profit. Based on the CAT Tournament (Trading Agent Competition Market Design) platform, we show with experiments that the new matching method not only increases market liquidity but also significantly improves market share and auctioneer's profit in the long term, compared with equilibrium matching, the most commonly used matching method.

AB - We study the problem of mechanism design for a double auction market where multiple buyers and sellers buy and sell a commodity. We design and implement a matching algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, including the number of transactions and buy/sell-volume. We prove that, given the number of matches, the algorithm also maximizes auctioneer's profit. Based on the CAT Tournament (Trading Agent Competition Market Design) platform, we show with experiments that the new matching method not only increases market liquidity but also significantly improves market share and auctioneer's profit in the long term, compared with equilibrium matching, the most commonly used matching method.

UR - http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/562741

UR - http://ai10.cis.unisa.edu.au/

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-17432-2_52

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-17432-2_52

M3 - Conference Paper

SN - 9783642174315

SP - 516

EP - 525

BT - AI 2010: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the 23rd Australasian Joint Conference, Adelaide, Australia, December 2010

PB - Springer

T2 - Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Y2 - 1 December 2013

ER -

Maximal matching for double auction

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