Mechanism design for double auctions with temporal constraints

Dengji Zhao, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel

    Research output: Chapter in Book / Conference PaperConference Paperpeer-review

    16 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    ![CDATA[This paper examines an extended double auction model where market clearing is restricted by temporal constraints. It is found that the allocation problem in this model can be effectively transformed into a weighted bipartite matching in graph theory. By using the augmentation technique, we propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in this model and demonstrate the advantages of the payment compared with the classical VCG payment (the Clarke pivot payment). We also show that the algorithms for both allocation and payment calculation run in polynomial time. It is expected that the method and results provided in this paper can be applied to the design and analysis of dynamic double auctions and futures markets.]]
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-11), Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, 16–22 July 2011
    PublisherAAAI Press
    Pages472-477
    Number of pages6
    ISBN (Print)9781577355137
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011
    EventInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence -
    Duration: 3 Aug 2013 → …

    Conference

    ConferenceInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
    Period3/08/13 → …

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