Methodology from the standpoint of experience : a comparison of Max Weber, Heinrich RIckert and John Stuart Mill

This paper interprets Weber's Rickertian theory of science as methodology articulated from the standpoint of experience. It thereby questions the view that Weber's methodology reflects a sympathy with neo-Kantian transcendental idealism. The first section explains the Baden School's distinction between transcendental argument and the explanation of events. The second traces Rickert's articulation of this distinction as a demarcation between epistemology and methodology. The third section examines Rickert's claim that his methodology is compatible with a consistent empiricism. The fourth section interprets differences between Rickert's and Weber's methodologies as indications of Weber's commitment to the standpoint of experience. Addressing three misconceptions of empiricism prevalent in Weber scholarship, the final section briefly compares Rickert's and Weber's methodologies with that of John Stuart Mill. Given that Rickert's influence on Weber is well documented we focus mainly on Rickert's methodology. Weber's arguments are considered in depth only where they significantly differ from Rickert's.