Modelling congestion and price competition in EV charging markets

Qi Wang, Dongmo Zhang, Bo Du

Research output: Chapter in Book / Conference PaperChapterpeer-review

Abstract

This paper model the EV charging market, treating EVs and stations as players. Our findings indicate that the Nash equilibrium does not accurately reflect the real-world competition among charging stations. This discrepancy arises because the decision-making processes of EVs and charging stations are not simultaneous. In this paper, we model this hierarchical decision-making process as a Stackelberg game, where charging stations act as leaders and EVs as followers. We further demonstrate that, under certain conditions, the Stackelberg equilibrium not only exists but is also unique. To validate our model, we use EV charging data from the Sydney city road network to examine how changes in charging prices impact EV flows. The results show the dynamic interaction between EVs and charging stations, highlighting the balancing effect of charging queues and price variations.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPRIMA 2024: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, 25th International Conference, Kyoto, Japan, November 18-24, 2024, Proceedings
EditorsRyuta Arisaka, Victor Sanchez-Anguix, Sebastian Stein, Reyhan Aydoğan, Leon van der Torre, Takayuki Ito
Place of PublicationSwitzerland
PublisherSpringer
Pages114-119
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9783031773679
ISBN (Print)9783031773662
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2025

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume15395
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Keywords

  • Charging stations
  • Electric vehicles
  • Stackelberg equilibrium

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