TY - JOUR
T1 - On defaults in action theories
AU - Strass, Hannes
AU - Thielscher, Michael
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
N2 - We study the integration of two prominent fields of logic-based AI: action formalisms and non-monotonic reasoning. The resulting framework allows an agent employing an action theory as internal world model to make useful default assumptions. We show that the mechanism behaves properly in the sense that all intuitively possible conclusions can be drawn and no implausible inferences arise. In particular, it suffices to make default assumptions only once (in the initial state) to solve projection problems.
AB - We study the integration of two prominent fields of logic-based AI: action formalisms and non-monotonic reasoning. The resulting framework allows an agent employing an action theory as internal world model to make useful default assumptions. We show that the mechanism behaves properly in the sense that all intuitively possible conclusions can be drawn and no implausible inferences arise. In particular, it suffices to make default assumptions only once (in the initial state) to solve projection problems.
UR - http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/549895
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-04617-9_38
DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-04617-9_38
M3 - Article
SN - 0302-9743
VL - 5803
SP - 298
EP - 305
JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ER -