Abstract
This paper presents a logical axiomatization of bargaining solutions. A bargaining situation is described in propositional logic and the bargainers' preferences are quantified in terms of the logical structure of the bargaining situation. A solution to the n-person bargaining problems is proposed based on the maxmin rule over the degrees of bargainers' satisfaction. We show that the solution is uniquely characterized by four natural and intuitive axioms as well as three other fundamental assumptions. All the axioms and assumptions are represented in logical statements and most of them have a game-theoretic counterpart. The framework would help us to identify the logical and numerical reasoning behind bargaining processes.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | AAAI-07/IAAI-07 Proceedings |
| Subtitle of host publication | 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 19th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference |
| Pages | 154-160 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 |
| Event | AAAI-07/IAAI-07 Proceedings: 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 19th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference - Vancouver, BC, Canada Duration: 22 Jul 2007 → 26 Jul 2007 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
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| Volume | 1 |
Conference
| Conference | AAAI-07/IAAI-07 Proceedings: 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 19th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Canada |
| City | Vancouver, BC |
| Period | 22/07/07 → 26/07/07 |