Abstract
This article examines two critical Cold War events—diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1949 onwards and the 1954-55 Quemoy- Matsu Crisis—through the lens of the early Australian-American alliance. Although Canberra and Washington both employed hard-line isolationist policies toward mainland China, Australian policymakers thought seriously more than their American counterparts about the possibility of recognizing Beijing as a means of preventing future PRC aggression in Northeast Asia. This trend continued throughout the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis when Australia also urged the United States to exercise restraint in the Taiwan Straits in fear of both countries being drawn into a wider war with China. Through exploring the interplay between Australia and the United States toward these issues, this article demonstrates that the early Australian-American relationship was far more intricate and two-sided than much of the existing literature suggests.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 72-107 |
Number of pages | 36 |
Journal | Journal of Northeast Asian History |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 2 |
Publication status | Published - 2014 |