Abstract
This article argues that the religious tests clause of s 116 of the Australian Constitution should be conceived of as an anti-discrimination provision embracing a distinction between direct and indirect religious tests equivalent to the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in other bodies of law. In other words, a religious test exists where there is discrimination, either directly or indirectly, on the ground of religion. The article develops this interpretation using a functionalist comparative analysis with other bodies of law, including European human rights law, American equal protection jurisprudence and Australian anti-discrimination law.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 545-578 |
Number of pages | 34 |
Journal | Monash University Law Review |
Volume | 42 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- comparative law
- law and legislation
- religious discrimination
- religious fundamentalism
- human rights
- Australian Constitution