The "I" beyond the subject/object opposition : Pareyson's conception of the self between Hegel and Heidegger

There is an aspect of Luigi Pareyson's thought that has received little critical attention to date: the place that his distinctive conception of the "I" occupies in the history of post-Heideggerian philosophy. Quite naturally, his notion of "person" (persona), which sits at the core of his philosophy, has received a significant amount of attention; however, it has not been considered in a broader historical and theoretical context, with the consequence that Pareyson's importance has often been underestimated, especially in the Anglophone world. In this chapter, I contend that Pareyson's conception of the "I" represents a distinctive, original, and fruitful solution to the problem of the overcoming of both subjectivism and objectivism. By "subjectivism," I mean the philosophical tenet that the nature of reality, as related to a given consciousness, is dependent on that consciousness - a position that was typical of modern philosophy from Descartes's "prioritization of the 'cogito'" onwards, and that is paradoxically related with "the attempt at a purely 'objective' understanding of the world" - that is, objectivism.