The numbers game : substantiality and the definition of genocide

Substantiality is an important but misunderstood part of the concept of genocide. One problem is that substantiality holds different meanings within law and sociology. Legally, substantiality is connected to the difficulty of proving there is “intention to destroy” in the absence of a specific plan. Substantiality in this sense is a marker of the level of death and destruction required to support an inference of intent. Sociologically, substantiality is connected to popular understandings of genocide that link the gravity of the crime to the volume of destruction. Substantiality in this latter sense has been problematized by scholars who point out that genocide does not necessarily entail a greater level of harm and destruction than other atrocities, which might fall under the label of war crimes or crimes against humanity. This article examines the concept of substantiality with a view to illuminating the tension that exists between legal and sociological understandings of genocide. The article uses the alleged genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar as a case study to demonstrate the complexity and contradictions of legal and sociological applications of the concept of substantiality. The article concludes that problems with substantiality reflect deeper problems with the recognition and articulation of the particular wrong inherent in the crime of genocide.