Abstract
Debt exchanges can benefit the governments that are party to the agreements, as well as the communities affected by the agreements. For creditor governments, debt exchanges allow elements of control over the uses to which funds liberated by debt cancellation are put and, perhaps more significantly, can be utilized to promote a broad range of strategic and other goals. despite having four distinct legislative frameworks under which debt exchanges can be conducted, the U.S. has made relatively little use of any of these schemes. Rather, the U.S. tends to fund massive debt cancellations on an ad hoc basis for countries it perceives as important to U.S. geo-political interests, while only authorising miserly amounts of funding under the four established debt-for-development legislative frameworks. We question whether it is really in the national interest of the U.S. to proceed in this manner and ignore the potential of the debt exchange to address possible national security concerns. Indeed, the U.S. is denying funding to programs it has established with considerable planning and forethought, over the implementation of which there are considerable checks and balances and in relation to which it has considerable influence as to the ultimate ends achieved. Yet at the same time the U.S. is bestowing massive funding to countries on a one-off, ad hoc basis, outside of established programs and over which there are few checks and balances.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Banking & Finance Law Review |
Publication status | Published - 2011 |
Open Access - Access Right Statement
© Carswell Publishing Feb 2011Keywords
- United States
- debt exchanges
- international finance
- monetary policy
- national security