Abstract
This article critically assesses Michael Kirby’s interpretive principle to reveal the assumptions underlying it and suggests that the principle is not really about international law but rather about moral claims regarding human dignity and the role of the judge. The article proceeds in three main parts. First, the interpretive principle is articulated, its different forms noted and its limitations considered. Secondly, the article reflects upon what the interpretive principle reveals about how Kirby sees the role of the judge and how this informs the interpretive principle. Finally, the article considers the emphasis Kirby places on human rights values and how international law fits into the interpretive principle.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 200-209 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | Australian Law Journal |
Volume | 87 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 2013 |