Conscience and time : can conscience, as it is described by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time, be considered as a temporal phenomenon?

Abstract

In 1927, Martin Heidegger published his magnum opus, Being and Time, which sought to ground the nature of the specifically human existence in temporality. Of primary importance in understanding the nature of being in general, was to understand the human experience - that he labelled Dasein - as a historical process, an occurrence; the movement of which defined the very nature of being. Heidegger differentiated between two potential modes of being of Dasein, one grounded in the world with others, into which it is thrown (inauthentic), and another wherein Dasein could be grounded in itself (authentic). In order to move authentically Dasein required a kind of access to itself that became possible only by way of a particular phenomenon, labelled as conscience [Gewissen]. Conscience and Gewissen are terms both derived ultimately from the Greek s??e?'d?s?? [syneidesis] and have evolved and developed throughout the history of philosophy, from its beginnings in Homer, through Paul the Apostle and many others, to find itself firmly implanted in popular culture. However, the conceptions of conscience visible throughout its history differ radically from the conscience that is outlined in Being and Time. Like those that came before it, Heidegger's conception of conscience is involved with being guilty, it calls and attests, but Heidegger's formulation is unique in that it lacks any specific content. In fact, instead of offering something to be heard, conscience is itself carefully designated by Heidegger as a specific type of listening, a hearkening [Horchen], which is further characterised as a type of resolved preparation: a readiness for being able to be summoned. This essay proposes that such a description intimates a specific temporality of conscience. This is not to say that Heidegger's conscience is something that occurs as an experience within a sequence of events. Instead, the phenomenon must be grounded as an occurrence, that is as something necessarily temporal and historical. This argument is secured by equating Heidegger's conscience with the ancient Greek concept of the ?a???'? [kairos] with which it shares a great deal. Ultimately, this examination leads us to reconsider the specific temporality of discourse as something that might itself be described as "kairological". By considering conscience in this manner, and describing it in temporal terms, it becomes possible to situate the phenomenon more securely within the unity of Dasein as care.

Date of Award	2018
Original language	English