From theory to practice: how Kant’s theoretical God became a postulate of pure practical reason

Abstract

Immanuel Kant is famous for his criticism of the traditional theoretical proofs for the existence of God, claiming that the metaphysical speculations underpinning these theories, including his own, were hopelessly flawed in their attempts to obtain knowledge of God. While rejecting them as the products of transcendental illusion, Kant would still retain God as a being who is fundamental to the needs of reason. He would show that while the interests of reason are indeed legitimate, yielding to them uncritically will result in the illusion that one can acquire knowledge of the existence of God. In spite of these negative arguments revealing the fallacies of reason related to the idea of God, Kant maintained that God is the metaphysical explanation for the systematic unity and necessity of the laws of nature. Kant’s critical adaptation of this prevalent early modern rationalistic position enabled him to transform the conception of God from an object of metaphysical enquiry into a regulative ideal of practical reason. The aim of this thesis is to explain how Kant’s early theoretical conception of God would undergo a transformation brought about by his development of serious doubts about how metaphysics was being applied to rational theology. Emerging from these doubts, I will show how Kant came to conceive of a useful conception of God as a regulative postulate of practical reason arising out of man’s innate commitment to morality.

Date of Award	2021
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	Western Sydney University
Supervisor	Jennifer Mensch (Supervisor)