How can classical utilitarianism answer the population problems Theory X is unable to solve?

Abstract

In Part Four of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit (1984) argues that questions related to future generations throw up issues that existing moral theories cannot adequality handle. The issues he makes explicit are: (1) a. The non-identity problem. b. The repugnant conclusion. c. The ridiculous conclusion. d. The absurd conclusion. e. The mere addition paradox. A new theory is needed to address these issues, Parfit claims, and he refers to the theory as Theory X. Ultimately, Parfit fails to find Theory X and notes in the concluding chapter of Reasons and Persons that “Though I failed to find a such a theory, I believe that, if they tried, others could succeed.” (Parfit 1984, 443). In this thesis I argue that classical utilitarianism can do everything Theory X is supposed to do. A classical utilitarian can: (2) a. Solve the non-identity problem. b. Avoid the repugnant conclusion. c. Avoid the ridiculous conclusion. d. Avoid the absurd conclusion. e. Solve the mere addition paradox. My approach in this thesis can be understood by way of a wristwatch analogy. Manufacturers of wristwatches test the sturdiness of their watches by subjecting them to intense shock tests, water depth tests, electrical shock tests, and so forth. The reason being, selling a wristwatch that has the wherewithal to work in the most challenging environments is desirable to consumers. Likewise in this thesis, I will employ epistemological and metaphysical resources with the aim of reaching conclusions that are “sceptic resistant”. Through a battery of epistemic tests, classical utilitarianism emerges in better shape than rival views. Furthermore, a metaphysical view about personal ontology (David Hume’s bundle view of the self) will aid me in pointing out that classical utilitarianism can do everything Theory X is supposed to do.

Date of Award	2023
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	Western Sydney University