The origin of philosophy in ressentiment : an exegesis of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality

Abstract

What is philosophy? What does it mean when an individual is described as a philosopher? The imputation of a vague loftiness of purpose has been characteristic of the layman's attitude towards the discipline. Within the discipline itself, attempts towards self-clarification are conducted under the aegis of further philosophical analysis. The value of philosophy itself "" as well as that of its preferred means of analysis "" is left unremarked upon and taken for granted. Friedrich Nietzsche took it upon himself to conduct this missing fundamental interrogation, and in so doing, assigned himself a unique vantage point. He insisted that his work was indeed philosophy, but simultaneously reserved a place for himself outside of 'traditional' philosophy. His rationale for this self-positioning was the sense that the true task of philosophy must be the clarification of values, including the value of philosophy itself. I believe the quote that serves as the epigraph for this introduction illustrates the distinctive line of attack of the Nietzschean critique. Nietzsche's critique of philosophy tends to be indistinguishable from a parallel critique of the philosopher as a human type. If the critique of philosophy is to be a clarification of the values that inhere within the discipline and inform it, the philosopher too must be similarly interrogated as to the values that constitute him, insomuch as 'philosophy is an involuntary memoir'.2 I submit that a broad critique of philosophy can be extricated from this critique of the philosopher as a human type, while being inclusive of it in acknowledgment of Nietzsche's commingling of the two. My aim is to perform an interpretative reconstruction of the origin of philosophy that will be sourced from Nietzsche's description of ressentiment in The Genealogy of Morality. The choice of text is because I believe it is here that Nietzsche's interrogation of values reaches its most concrete lucidity with devastating effects on the traditional practice of philosophy. Ressentiment functions as the focal point in my interpretation because it plays a negative, but nonetheless fundamental role in value-production. My interpretation is therefore guided by the Nietzschean-informed hypothesis that philosophy is the culmination of this ressentiment-driven negative value orientation.

Date of Award	2020
Original language	English