The place of phronesis in Gadamer's hermeneutics

Abstract

Gadamer's concern with the concept of phronesis was ongoing and deep. This thesis explores the ethical significance of Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics by examining the place of phronesis in his main work, Truth and Method. In that work, Gadamer draws upon the concept of phronesis to answer what he calls 'the problem of application.' It is argued that phronesis achieves this by furnishing a unique model of the relationship between universal and particular, allowing Gadamer to construct an account of the historicity of understanding which avoids any appeal to a truth outside of history without falling into the pitfall of historical relativism. It is argued that 'concretisation' is the best way to understand the solution arrived at here. This point helps us to understand the way in which human beings exist historically. However, this thesis also argues that phronesis plays a role in Truth and Method beyond Gadamer's explicit discussion. Phronesis is not only a model or analogy for the historicity of understanding, but also forms part of its content. That is, the truth which manifests in understanding is a truth with an ethical significance. This is made clear in an investigation of Gadamer's discussion of the truth of the human sciences. In this way, this thesis contributes to knowledge of the ethical implications of Gadamer's hermeneutics, exploring how understanding is an ethical task.

Date of Award	2021
Original language	English