You as you always were' : Samuel Beckett and Kantian critical philosophy

Abstract

This dissertation makes an extensive critical comparison between the representation of human consciousness in the work of Samuel Beckett and Immanuel Kant. It examines the proposition that Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy, particularly his representation of the human subject and consciousness as described in his Critique of Pure Reason, can be seen to be significant to an understanding of the work of Samuel Beckett. To date, there is no extensive or comprehensive explication of this topic. There are significant theoretical and primary textual grounds for such a comparison, which are further supported by substantial secondary textual, archival, and historical evidence. The thesis is developed through a methodology based on the former of these as opposed to the latter, though the relative virtues of both are discussed in detail. An interpretation of Kantian subjectivity is developed that follows primarily from the work on the subject by Adorno and Deleuze, and emphasises the weaknesses and limitations of human consciousness. This begins with an analysis of Kant's reformulation of the cogito and the problematic nature of the subject, before proceeding to discuss the subsequent problems in the relationship between the subject and the world of objects. All the while the relevance of this to Beckett's oeuvre is considered through close readings, focusing primarily on Beckett's later works. Finally, the thesis explores how a species of Kant's skeptical consciousness can be seen to be reflected in Beckett, on the premise that this is a more legible viewpoint than the historic tendency of readings to polarise Beckett's work as being either nihilistic or humanist.

Date of Award	2017
Original language	English